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Whether a person is given a loaded label like ‘irregular’ migrant, refugee or
trafficked person, can make the difference between arrest and protection, or
between deportation and asylum, or between return to an uncertain fate and
assistance for a decent life. In short, the distinctions we make in the language
of international law may mean the difference between life and death.
But the categories we use are not mutually exclusive. Take for instance, a
migrant who pays to be smuggled and is tortured to extort money from his
parents before being delivered to his destination. He is not necessarily a victim
of  trafficking, but is a migrant who has experienced an aggravated form of
smuggling and may have significant protection and assistance needs as a result.1
In contrast, at the point that a victim of trafficking is identified, he may not
have suffered as much at the hands of his traffickers. The labels ‘trafficked’ or
‘smuggled’ then, may not speak to the specific plight or needs of  the individuals
they attach to. Similarly, the fact that a refugee falls victim to traffickers does
not mean that she does not also have a well-founded fear of persecution, and
the fact that a person pays to be smuggled does not mean that he is not a
victim of trafficking or in search of asylum. Indeed, one situation may be a
cause or result of another.
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1 See article 6(3) of  UN General Assembly, Protocol against the Smuggling of  Migrants
by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, 15 November 2000.
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The value of these labels to those who ascribe them and those they are ascribed
to comes from what is done with them. As it is, a smuggled migrant may be
criminalised for that fact, contrary to international law, and be deported
notwithstanding a valid claim not to be. A victim of trafficking may gain more
from being considered an exploited migrant labourer, who can seek a civil
remedy and receive the wages owed to her, than from being recognised as a
victim and made to wait for months in a trafficking shelter for a criminal
process which possibly does not result in any compensation.2 It might not
matter to a refugee that she is not recognised as such under the 1951 Refugees
Convention if she is spared from refoulement as a victim of trafficking or a
survivor of  torture.
Effort needs to be invested then not in forcing distinctions between terms,
but in responsibly applying them so that people who fall—or rather, are
placed—into these categories do not miss out on entitlements because of or
despite the labels applied to them. Success in this endeavour does not lie in
the extent to which tidy distinctions are cleaved between concepts, but in the
extent to which the full raft of international treaties is leveraged for the benefit
of those in need of assistance and protection.
Doing otherwise suggests that there may be disingenuous approaches taken
to what should be good faith interpretations of  international law.3 Those
who would rather approach victims of  trafficking as smuggled migrants may
be seeking to take advantage of a lax understanding and application of the
framework protecting smuggled migrants. And those who fixate, for instance,
on disassociating ‘refugees’ from what it is to be a ‘migrant’ overlook the
chaotic circumstances of individuals and the common shifts in factors driving
human mobility.4 This ‘one or the other’ agenda fuels a destructive turf  war
over topic-territory that ultimately may come at the cost of meaningful
2 Based on the author’s own consultations with practitioners. See also:  A Testa
and E Taylor-Nicholson, Enabling Access to Justice: A CSO perspective on the challenges
of realising the rights of South Asian migrants in the Middle East, Global Alliance




3 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969, Article 31.
4 See for instance:  J  Carl ing,  ‘Refugee Advocacy and the Meaning of
“Migrants”’, PRIO Policy Brief 2, PRIO, Oslo, 2017.
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protection of the people caught in its crossfire. It also signals to those who
work at the frontline and along the fault lines to respond to urgent human
needs and who do not have the time, capacity or incentive to scrutinise and
unravel the interconnected threads of  international law, that ‘migrant’ is a
label not worth having. To play tug-of-war over classifications is to treat as
simple what is unquestionably complicated, and to surrender to political spin
that would have us believe that ‘irregular’ migrants cannot also be victims of
trafficking or that they have lesser rights to seek asylum than others.
When all is said and done though, there is one label that must be applied even
when all others are tussled over, intellectualised, hierarchised and brutalised.
Whether a refugee, trafficked person, smuggled migrant, ‘irregular’ migrant or
formerly known as ‘illegal’ migrant, stateless, female, male, transgender,
intersex, gay, straight or still experimenting and undecided—the category to
which every person belongs, is this: human.
Human rights attach to us on the basis of our inherent dignity as human
beings. These rights are not diminished when another label is ascribed to the
human at issue, or by the circumstance she has placed herself in or has been
placed in by others. Sometimes, in some contexts, clear distinctions can be
made between migrants, refugees and trafficked persons. But when distinctions
cannot be made on the basis of facts at hand, they should not be forced on the
basis of the agendas at issue. In the current geopolitical climate, the architecture
of international law is at risk of crumbling under the weight of disrespect and
indifference, resulting in international organisations wielding semantics as a
weapon in the fight for dwindling funds. The framework of human rights
law is a casualty we cannot afford. Whatever labels may be ascribed to us, when
it comes to human rights, it is important and necessary that we remain
indistinguishable.5
5 Some of the ideas expressed in this article are more fully explored in: M McAdam,
‘What’s in a Name? Victim naming and blaming in rights-based distinctions
between human trafficking and migrant smuggling’, International Human Rights
Law Review, vol. 4, issue 1, 2015, pp. 1–32.
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